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empirical analysis the consumer's inability to smooth consumption appears as prevalent 
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Has structural change in consumer credit markets made consumption smoother? Or has the
expansion of consumer credit markets only served to make consumers more vulnerable to shocks?
Given recent research a good argument can be made that the latter appears to be the case. The
consumer’s inability to smooth consumption appears as prevalent as ever. Gross and Souleles
(2002) examine micro data on credit cards to explain the lack of smoothing apparent in consumption
data, while Attanasio et al (2004) look at auto loans to make this point. Similarly, Wakabayashi
and Horioka (2005) do so with Japanese household data. On the aggregate level, Ludvigson
(1999) shows that consumer credit is a signiﬁcant predictor of consumption in the United States–
consistent with a lack of smoothing–while Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997) document this abroad.
All told these studies are the latest generation of a signiﬁcant body of research emphasizing the
importance of credit market, or “liquidity,” constraints in explaining the empirical failure of the
Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypotheses as espoused in Hall (1978).1
In this paper, however, I show that in the midst of structural change in consumer credit mar-
kets, consumption smoothing now appears to be a reality. I ﬁnd structural breaks in the series
for consumer credit and consumption consistent with regulatory and structural change in credit
markets. To estimate the breaks, I use the methods of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) for estimating
deterministic breaks. Most notably, structural breaks occur in total consumer credit and revolving
consumer credit in approximately 1995 for the former and 1983 and 1998 for the latter. Then,
motivated by the break date estimates, I estimate a structural equation of consumption growth
in line with previous empirical tests of the permanent income hypothesis. The structural esti-
mation ﬁrst serves to conﬁrm previous ﬁndings, both income growth and consumer credit predict
consumption growth in samples up through approximately the mid-1980s. However, the structural
1While Hall (1978) showed that intertemporal consumption follows a random walk, evidence has showed that
lagged income, and for Ludvigson (1999) and Baccheta and Gerlach (1997), consumer credit, have predictive power
for current consumption. For additional research on liquidity constraints–as well as additional possible reasons for
the lack of consumption smoothing, such as rule of thumb behavior and precautionary motives–see Zeldes (1989),
Jappelli (1990), Cambell and Mankiw (1989) Hayashi (1982, 1985), Chah, Ramey and Starr (1995), and Carroll
(2001)).
1estimation reveals that the prediction power of either income growth and consumer credit growth
generally fails after the mid-1980s, and the model completely “breaks down” after 1995. While the
data suggests that consumption smoothing does not hold in earlier eras, consumption smoothing
is evident after the mid-1980s and into the 2000s.
With this two-pronged empirical strategy, this paper makes an important connection. First, this
paper shows that, indeed, consumer credit has changed over the last thirty years, with structural
change apparent in the statistical behavior of the series. And second, this proves to be notable
as the structural change is consistent with consumption smoothing that is shown to be evident
in the data. The structural estimation reveals that unlike the previous research on consumption
behavior–particularly the recent emphasis on credit card borrowing and other micro data used
to support a lack of consumption smoothing–consumption smoothing is a feature of consumption
data and liquidity constraints, in particular, are no longer important for consumer behavior.
The ﬁndings of this paper have important implications for a variety of economic research. First,
consumption smoothing and liquidity constraints bear directly on the eﬃcacy of monetary policy
and ﬁscal policy. Liquidity constraints, ceteris paribus, make households more sensitive to policy
or general macroeconomic shocks. Consistent with this notion, household balance sheets are cited
as an important source for the propagation of monetary shocks and the ampliﬁcation of their eﬀects
(see Bernanke and Gertler (1995), and Bernanke et al (1996), and Mishkin (1977, 1978)). This may
be especially relevant today given recent concerns that households are over-indebted; rely too much
on credit card borrowing (see the Gross and Souleles (2002) paper reference above); and as a result
are leaving themselves exposed to such shocks. Relatedly, for ﬁscal policy, the existence of liquidity
constraints implies that households should spend a signiﬁcant portion of a tax rebate (see Coronado
et al (2005), and Johnson et al (2004), for analysis of recent ﬁscal stimuli), or reduce consumption
in the opposite scenario.
However, if households smooth consumption, as the data here suggest, then aggregate demand
management should have little eﬀect on short run spending. In this view, greater access to credit is
a positive tool for consumption smoothing and responding to changes in policy or economic shocks
2in general. In a complementary paper, I examine time series data on credit card balances and
available liquidity to ﬁnd support for the positive beneﬁts the growth in credit card borrowing,
including the ability to smooth consumption (Brady (2005)). Since deregulation of the credit card
industry in 1978 and of commercial banking in the early 1980s, the supply of consumer credit
has increased to all households, especially to the subset of borrowers previously considered to be
liquidity-constrained (see Athreya (2002); Evans and Schmalensee (1999); and Brady (2004)).
Note, too, at issue is not merely how consumers may or may not respond to policy changes, but
that consumption smoothing suggests appropriate policy strategies. The results in this paper speak
directly to the debate–gaining much attention with the recent appointment of Ben Bernanke to
replace Alan Greenspan as Federal Reserve chairman–regarding discretionary monetary manage-
ment versus a less-discretionary inﬂation-targeting “framework.”2 Consumption smoothing implies
that discretionary demand management is ineﬀective. More liquid consumers are able to smooth
in the anticipation of policy changes or even better absorb unanticipated changes.
Further still, the results of this paper support the view that structural changes are behind the
“Great Moderation” of the macroeconomy. McConnell and Perez-Quiros (1999), and others have
documented the decline in macroeconomic volatility since the mid-1980s.3 In line with this decline
has been an interest in discovering the underlying sources–with explanations ranging from the
“structural,” to “good policy,” to it’s just been a matter of “good luck.”4 The structural change in
consumer credit markets and coincident consumption smoothing documented in this paper provide
corroborative evidence that the consumer sector, in particular, is an important source of the decline
in volatility (McConnell and Perez-Quiros (1999) emphasize the decline in the volatility of consumer
durables, while Ramey and Vine (2004) focus on changes in the automobile industry5).
The section that follows discusses the literature on consumption smoothing and also puts into
2See Bernanke and Blinder (1997).
3See Kim and Nelson (1999) and Stock and Watson (2002) for additional documentation. See also, Cambell (2005),
Cecchetti et al (2004) and Ramey and Vine (2005) for further discussion and analysis of the “Great Moderation.”
4See Ahmed et al (2002) for a summary.
5Though interestingly, Ramey and Vine (2004) make the argument that the structural change they ﬁnd in the
automobile industry is borne of a change in the policy function of the Federal Reserve.
3context developments in consumer credit markets that bear directly on the issue. To substantiate
the claims set forth thus far, that discussion is followed by the empirical analysis, including the
structural break techniques and the estimation of a structural consumption equation over various
sub-samples.
2 Consumption Smoothing with Structural and Regulatory Change
Since Hall’s (1978) formulation of the Life-Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis, much has been
written on consumption smoothing, and in particular, the apparent lack of consumption smoothing
in the data. Hall (1978) showed that if rational consumers maximize intertemporal utility (meaning
that marginal utility, and hence, consumption, follow a random walk), then policies that change
short-run income, such as temporary tax rebates or expansionary monetary policy, will have no
aﬀect on consumption.6 Consumption will only change in so far as the policies aﬀect permanent
income and for Hall’s consumer, the level of consumption today should embody all predictable
changes in income from the past. Empirically, no variable except past consumption should help
predict the behavior of consumption.
However, Flavin (1981,1985), Hayashi (1982,1985), Cambell and Mankiw (1989), Bacchetta
and Gerlach (1997), Ludvigson (1999), and others have provided a variety of evidence that lagged
values of income and even consumer credit do have predictive content for consumption. In the
parlance of the research, consumption is “excessively” sensitive to a change in current income.
Speciﬁcally, following Hall (1978), Flavin (1981) and Hayashi (1982) show that when regressing
consumption growth on lagged values of income reveals consumption is not entirely determined
by lagged consumption.7 Similarly, Ludvigson (1999) and Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997) show
6Hall (1978) refers to the “Life-Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis.” For brevity of exposition, we focus on the
permanent income hypothesis. Though very similar to the permanent income hypothesis, the life cycle hypothesis
diﬀers with a greater emphasis on the underlying utility function and that consumption out of a transitory change in
income is a function of a household’s lifespan, to name two examples (Mayer (1972)). The two theories are closely
linked, however, by their mutual emphasis on the relationship between consumption and permanent income (Hall
(1978)).
7In a rejoinder, Hall and Mishkin (1982) test this possibility using panel data and argue that the fraction of
consumers that are “sensitive”–about 20 percent–is probably not enough to have an appreciable eﬀect on aggregate
4with both U.S. data and international data, respectively, that consumer credit is also a signiﬁcant
predictor of current consumption. In other words, the data suggests that consumer do not smooth
consumption.
This apparent lack of consumption smoothing has engendered some popular culprits. Cambell
and Mankiw (1989) argue that approximately half of all consumers follow a “rule-of-thumb” while
the remaining portion abide by the permanent income hypothesis. Alternatively, consumers may
suﬀer from myopia (see Shea (1995a, b) for discussions). A more often discussed reason for the
lack of consumption smoothing are borrowing or “liquidity” constraints in credit markets. Such
papers include Chah, Ramey and Starr (1995), Jappelli et al (1998), Ludvigson (1999), Bacchetta
and Gerlach (1997), Gross and Souleles (2002), Zinman (2003), Attanasio et al (2004) as well as
earlier papers by Flavin (1985), Hayashi (1985), and Zeldes (1989). Ludvigson (1999), for example,
shows that consumer credit growth is a signiﬁcant predictor of consumption growth, independent
of income growth, while Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997) provide similar evidence for countries other
than the United States. And Gross and Souleles (2002) use a panel of credit card data for the
years 1995 to 1998 to argue that household credit card use is indicative of liquidity-constraints.
Though the issue is far from settled. While empirically evident, the economic signiﬁcance
of liquidity constraints for aggregate consumption may be minimal. Hayashi (1985) notes the
decline in consumption he documents is small. Also, Zeldes (1989) ﬁnds that liquidity constraints
are most important for younger households, which may not aﬀect aggregate consumption to a
signiﬁcant degree (which is consistent with Jappelli (1990)).8 In general, Runkle (1990), Altonji
and Siow (1987), and recently Dejuan et al (2004) provide evidence in support of the permanent
income hypothesis and consumption smoothing. Also, in work that complements the current
study, I ﬁnd that data on credit card balances and credit card limits suggests that consumers in
consumption in the short-run.
8Cox and Jappelli (1993), however, argue that even if the “eﬀect of liquidity constraints on consumption is small
. . . the eﬀect on household balance sheets could conceivably be much larger. Credit constraints could aﬀect
leveraged purchases of durables and housing”(p198). Cox and Jappelli (1993) conclude that constrained households
would increase debt by 75 percent given they became unconstrained. Also, Mayﬁeld (1989) shows that constrained
households consume fewer durable goods relative to nondurable goods than do unconstrained agents.
5the aggregate use credit cards to smooth consumption, disavowing, in particular, the relevance of
liquidity constraints (Brady (2005)).
Even if one feels the statistical evidence provided against the Life Cycle-Permanent Income
Hypotheses is compelling, after two and half decades of structural and regulatory change, the
support against the hypotheses may actually be out-dated. In the brief section that follows, I
discuss how the deregulation of the credit card industry and of commercial banking eased access
to, and expanded the supply of, consumer credit. With easier access to credit, therefore, economic
theory suggests that households will smooth consumption (Hall (1978)).
2.1 Regulatory and Structural change in Consumer Lending
Various strands of economic research suggest that factors such as the deregulation, commercial
bank consolidation, and other aspects of structural change in ﬁnancial markets are beneﬁcial to
small borrowers in particular. This appears to be especially true for households. Traditionally,
households are characterized as bank dependent, whose access to credit is restricted during re-
cessions or other periods of ﬁnancial distress, with the eﬀects of economic recessions and credit
crunches falling disproportionately on households (see Mishkin (1977,1978), and Peek and Rosen-
gren (1995)). However, with a more integrated national market households can likely access credit
more readily even during periods of distress. These changes have been predominately wrought by
the removal of credit card interest rate ceilings in 1978 and the deregulation of commercial banking
in the early 1980s.9
The Supreme Court ruling in the 1978 case, Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of
Omaha Service Corporation, 439 US 299, deregulated credit card interest rates. This initiated an
9Additional important components to this story include the increased use of securitization in credit markets and
the importance of credit scoring for consumer lending. While the latter was developed in 1958 and became widespread
in the 1960s and 1970s (McCorkell, 2002), in conjunction with the regulatory change, credit scoring has enabled the
expansion of consumer credit by lowering the cost of provision and making it easier to identify quality borrowers
(Bostic, 2002). As a result, credit is not only allocated to high quality borrowers more eﬃciently, but makes lending
to lower quality borrowers more proﬁtable, expanding the supply of credit to them as well (Athreya (2002), Evans and
Schmalens (1999)). Also, securitization (ﬁrst done with credit card receivables in 1986, following in the footsteps
of mortgages in 1970) lowers costs and encourages an increase in supply overall and to more marginal borrowers
(Johnson (2002), Ryding (1990)).
6expansion of consumer credit, as lenders could compete over a geographically broader market (Evans
and Schmalensee (1999), Ellis (1998)). Before the ruling, 36 of 38 states surveyed in the Federal
Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances restricted credit card interest rates (Zinman, 2003).
The Supreme Court ruling eﬀectively eliminated state usury laws by allowing First of Omaha the
right to oﬀer credit card services to residents of Minnesota. The provision of credit cards has since
been dominated by a few large banks operating across state lines.
In addition, the 1980 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA)
and the 1982 Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act, helped make consumer lending more
proﬁtable (hence, increasing the supply). DIDMCA was passed to allow banks to oﬀer competitive
interest rates on deposits (such as NOW accounts). The legislation also scheduled the end of reg-
ulation Q interest rate ceilings by 1986. The Garn-St Germain Act allowed banks to oﬀer money
market deposit accounts, which were free of reserve requirements and were not subject to regula-
tion Q interest rate restrictions (Berger, 1995). While many decry the consolidation of commercial
banking that has followed deregulation, consumer lending has, in fact, increased.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 display a snapshot of commercial banking at diﬀerent points from 1972 to
2002. Consistent with consolidation, the number of banks has declined, asset concentration has
increased, and the share of consumer lending for banks in the lower end of the asset distribution has
declined. The real amount of consumer lending has increased while the share of consumer lending
by the bottom 95 percent of banks has fallen from just over 40 percent in 1972 to 10 percent in
2002. However, consumer lending as a share of total lending for the top ﬁve percent of banks
has increased slightly from 1972 to 2002, from approximately 16 percent of the loan portfolio to
approximately 18 percent.10
These numbers support the proposition that a large bank is likely to oﬀer more services than
a small independent bank, service a larger base of customers, and as result, manage risk more
eﬃciently (Berger et al (1995)). For example, credit card lending, associated with a lack of collateral
and lack of monitoring, requires the economies of scale best handled by a large organization (Peak
10These last two numbers are not shown explicitly in Tables 1 and 2, but are easily calculated from Table 2.
7and Rosengren (1998)). Second, after deregulation, large banks can now serve customers who
were previously the exclusive province of local banks. In this light, relationship lending and the
comparative advantage of the local lender, so often viewed through rose-colored glasses, has really
been a product of restrictions on interstate banking (more on this shortly). Consistent with this
perspective, empirical evidences suggests that small business lending, for example, has not suﬀered
following the deregulation of commercial banking in the early 1980s or from the merger activity of
the 1980s and 1990s (see Peak and Rosengren (1998), Strahan and Weston (1998), and Jayaratne
and Wolken (1999) substantiating this view).
Interestingly, the increase in consumer lending runs counter to the typical objection of bank
consolidation–that bank-dependent borrowers, such as small ﬁrms and households, might lose
access to credit as large banks absorb small, local lenders (Berger et al (1995), Berger et al (1999)).
Some research indicates that traditionally the relationship between the local bank and the small
borrower has been special. The local bank is thought to have a comparative advantage over larger,
non-local institutions, where the ability to monitor locally makes the loan proﬁtable at the margin
(Peek and Rosengren (1998), Strahan and Weston (1999)). In contrast, the larger institution may
suﬀer from diseconomies of scale, where the cost of monitoring is too high for a complex institution
engaged in oﬀering a variety of services. Berger et al (2004) document that large institutions
tend to lend to more geographically distant customers, have shorter and less exclusive relationships
with their customers, and overall interact impersonally with their customers. Alternatively, others
have shown that small ﬁrms beneﬁt from the local relationship, gaining easier access to credit and
receiving lower rates versus similar ﬁrms without an established relationship (Peterson and Rajan
(1994), Berger and Udell (1996)). Therefore, if local banks are enveloped by larger institutions,
the relationship-dependent borrower may suﬀer. However, again, research and data suggest that
neither small business lending nor consumer lending has suﬀered from these developments.
These developments are important for consumers because with more integrated markets and
large banking organizations, the brunt of recessions should fall less disproportionately on “small”
borrowers such as households (Berger et al (1999); Houston and James (1998); Strahan and Weston
8(1998)). Moreover, with easier access to credit we might see a more tempered business cycle as
households smooth consumption. This interpretation is consistent with research that has docu-
mented an apparent decline in the volatility of the business cycles since the middle of the 1980s
(see McConnell and Quiros-Perez (1999), and Stock and Watson (2002)). And, with respect to
research on consumption behavior, one might expect that consumption smoothing is more likely a
reality recently than found for data from the 1980s and before. Hence, in the remainder of this
study, I do two things: 1) I consider the presence of breaks in the time series for consumption
and consumer credit using statistical techniques; and 2) I use the structural breaks to estimate a
structural equation for consumption growth over time. Details of the latter step are provided later,
while I discuss the former step in the next section.
3 Structural Break Search
In this section I use the statistical techniques of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) to search for breaks
in the time series behavior of consumption and consumer credit. Consistent with McConnell and
Perez-Quiros (1999), one might expect a break in consumption growth or volatility at some point in
the sample in the mid-1980s (at least). With respect to consumer credit, there could be a number
of breaks in the mean growth rate or in the volatility of the series consistent with regulatory changes
in the late 1970s and early 1980s; with commercial bank consolidation in the late 1980s and early
1990s (and beyond); and with further regulatory changes in commercial banking in the mid-to-late
1990s.
Speciﬁcally, I search for a break in the means of the log diﬀerence of total consumption ex-
penditures and its components, durables and nondurables plus services; and total consumer credit
and its components, nonrevolving consumer credit and revolving consumer credit. Estimation is
performed on monthly data from January 1959 through September 2005.11 Though for revolving
credit, the sample runs from January 1978 through September 2005. I begin the sample in 1978
11Each series is expressed in seasonally adjusted 2000 dollars.
9to avoid jumps in the revolving series prior to that date (the series actually begins in 1968).
The Bai and Perron (1998) method for estimating multiple unknown breakpoints is based on
the minimization of the objective function,
SSRT(T1,...,Tm), (1)
where Tj denotes the break dates (j = 1,...,m) and SSRT is the sum of squared residuals
after each m-partition (T1,...,Tm) has been estimated using least squares. The objective function
SSRT (T1,...,Tm) is constructed with the regression estimates from each m-partition, e.g., ˆ β ({Tj}).
Formally, the break point estimates are
￿





Multiple test statistics are provided by Bai and Perron (1998) to test the hypothesis of m = 0
breaks versus the alternative of m = k breaks. For brevity, we restrict our attention to two of
these statistics. The ﬁrst generalizes the supF test detailed in Andrews (1993) in order to test for
multiple break points. The supF test is motivated by the fact that in a hypothesis test of structural
change, the break point, Tj, appears as a parameter under the alternative hypothesis but not the
null. Therefore, the usual Wald, LM, or LR-statistics fail to have standard asymptotic properties
(see Andrews (1993) and Andrews, Lee and Ploberger (1996) for discussion on this point). For the
case when k = 1, the F-statistic, F(T1,...,Tm) is constructed for all possible break dates and the
Tj that maximizes supF(T1...,Tj) will be the estimated break date.
A variant of the supF tests for the presence of m + 1 breaks given that m breaks are present.
Given the model with m breaks, the strategy then tests each m+1 additional partition. In practice,
one is performing m + 1 tests of m = 0 breaks versus the alternative of m = 1 breaks. The test
amounts to choosing the model with m+1 breaks if the sum of the squared residuals is smaller than
the model with m breaks (i.e., rejecting the null that the latter case is true). In the application
10of the tests, each series is modeled with the growth rate modeled as an AR(1) process.12 The
maximum number of breaks for consumption and nonrevolving consumer credit is set to 5, while
for revolving consumer credit and its shorter sample the maximum number of breaks is set to 3.13
Tables 3.1 through 3.10 display the results of the various tests I use to choose the number of
deterministic breaks in each series, for both the mean growth rate and the volatility of each series
(explained below). The tables combine to display the supF(m|0) and supF(m+1|m) statistics
for the mean growth rate of each series; the estimated break dates (obtained from the global
optimization ) associated with the maximum of the supF statistics; and the parameter estimates
of each series modeled as an AR(1), with the number of break dates inferred from the supF tests
supported by Bai and Perron’s (1998) sequential method (which in these results support the choice
of breaks found by the supF(m|0) and supF(m+1|m) statistics).
3.0.1 The Mean Growth Rate of Consumer Credit
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 display the results for total consumer credit and its components, revolving and
nonrevolving consumer credit. Panel A of Table 3.1 displays the results for total consumer credit.
The supF test of zero versus m breaks is maximized when m = 2 (21.95). The supF test of m+1
breaks versus m breaks also is maximized when m = 2 (13.67). The estimated break dates from
the global optimization for m = 2 are February 1966 and September 1995. Panel B displays the
results for revolving consumer credit. The supF test of zero versus m breaks is maximized when
m = 1 (44.73), while the supF test of m + 1 breaks versus m breaks is maximized when m = 2
(13.67). The estimated break dates from the global optimization for m = 2 are December 1983
12Mathematically, if x is the series being tested,
∆xt = µ + ∆xt−1 .
Estimating in this manner follows a recent literature that has used structual break techniques to analyze macro-
economic stability in the post-War era. References include McConnell and Perez-Quiros (1999), Stock and Watson
(2002), and Ahmed et al (2002). Also, considering alternatives, such as modeling the series as AR(0), AR(2) and
higher, do not lead to signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the estimated break dates. Note that for Bai and Peron’s (1998) tests,
including a lag of the dependent variable requires the assumption that serial correlation is not present in the errors.
13Five is the recommended number by Bai and Perron (1998) for a sample of this size. Intuitively, this implies
that the test allows for the possiblility that there have been ﬁve events or points at which the mean of consumption
growth has changed over the last forty-ﬁve years.
11and April 1998. For nonrevolving credit in panel B, the supF(m|0) and supF(m+1|m) tests are
maximized when m = 3 (31.03 and 41.62, respectively). The estimated break dates from the global
optimization for m = 3 are October 1961, August 1976 and October 1992.
To provide a sense of the diﬀerence between the time periods suggested from the results in Table
3.1, Table 3.2 displays the parameter estimates for estimating the AR(1) model in the diﬀerent time
periods.14 The point to note is the noticeable diﬀerence in the estimated parameters across the
samples. Using the estimated break dates in a Chow test conﬁrms that there is a statistically
signiﬁcance diﬀerence between these periods (displayed in Table 3.3). Only the October 1961 date
for nonrevolving consumer credit is not statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level.
3.0.2 The Mean Growth Rate of Consumption
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 display the results for consumption, consumer durables, and for consumer non-
durables plus services. For the consumption series, the value of supF(m|0) is maximized when
m = 1 and is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. The supF(m+1|m) test suggests that
any additional breaks are statistically insigniﬁcant. The date corresponding to the single break
is January 1984. For consumer durables, the value of supF(m|0) is maximized when m = 1 and
is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. Similar to the overall consumption series, the
supF(m+1|m) suggests that any additional breaks are not statistically signiﬁcant. The date cor-
responding to the break is April 1982. The outcome for the nondurables plus services component
is nearly identical to the other consumption series. However, the date corresponding to the m = 1
comes much earlier in the sample, in February 1973. The parameter estimates from each series
estimated over these split samples are reported in Table 3.5. The accompanying Chow test results
are displayed with the results for consumer credit in Table 3.3. The Chow tests reveal that the
diﬀerence between the periods is statistically signiﬁcant.
14Note that at this stage, I refrain from comparing the parameter estimates in detail. Here, I seek to simply
document whether changes have occured in the process generating the series. This will serve to motivate the next
section, where I compare and discuss structural estimates across time.
123.0.3 The Volatility of Consumer Credit
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 display the results for structural break tests on the volatility of the consumer
credit series. For lack of a method for consistently estimating the structural break in the variance
of a series, I look for a break in the absolute value of the growth rate of each series (see Timmerman
(2001) for an example of this method). Panel A of Table 3.6 displays the results for total consumer
credit. The supF test of zero versus m breaks is maximized when m = 1, while the supF test
shows that any additional breaks are statistically insigniﬁcant. The estimated break date from
the global optimization for m = 1 is January 1966. The estimated parameters before and after
this date are reported in Table 3.7. The Chow tests associated with these dates are reported in
Table 3.8. Panel B of Table 3.6 displays the results for revolving consumer credit. Similar to the
total series, the supF test of zero versus m breaks is maximized when m = 1, while the supF test
shows that any additional breaks are statistically insigniﬁcant. The estimated break date from
the global optimization for m = 1 is April 1998. The parameter estimates and Chow tests are
reported in Tables 3.7 and 3.8, respectively. For nonrevolving credit in panel B, the supF(m|0)
and supF(m+1|m) tests suggest there is not a statistically signiﬁcant break in the volatility.
3.0.4 The Volatility of Consumption
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 displays the results for consumption, consumer durables, and for consumer
nondurables plus services. For the consumption series, the value of supF(m|0) is maximized when
m = 1 and is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. The supF(m+1|m) test suggests
that any additional breaks are statistically insigniﬁcant. The date corresponding to the single
break is February 1987. For consumer durables, the value of supF(m|0) is maximized when m = 1
and is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. Similar to the overall consumption series,
the supF(m+1|m) suggests that any additional breaks are not statistically signiﬁcant. The date
corresponding to the break is December 1984. For nondurables plus services, the supF(m|0) is
maximized when m = 1 and is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. However, the
13date corresponding to the m = 1 comes much earlier in the sample, in October 1988. The
parameter estimates for each series estimated over the split samples are reported in Table 3.10, and
the diﬀerence between the between the periods is statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level
(Table 3.8).
3.0.5 Interpretation of Break Test Results
Overall, the plethora of information provided by the break tests is help understand the evolution
of deregulation and structural change in credit markets. The dates are not exact. But given
that the eﬀects of structural changes or regulatory change unfold over time, ﬁnding dates in the
data that accord exactly with speciﬁc events might be unlikely. For revolving credit, for example,
the breaks in the mean growth rates are consistent with two general periods in the evolution of
revolving credit. The 1983 date may signal the shift in the growth rate of the series as the eﬀects
were beginning to take hold—on the heels of the deregulation of credit card interest rates in 1978,
and the DIDMCA legislation and Garn-St. Germain Act and of 1980 and 1982, respectively.15
In addition, the 1998 date for revolving credit, and the 1995 date for the total credit series
may represent a similar shift with respect to legislation and structural change (moreover, the break
in the volatility of revolving credit is found in 1998). These mid-to-late 1990s dates may reﬂect
the eﬀects of the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 (if not the eﬀects of deregulation put in motion in the
early 1980s). The 1994 Act, which deregulated interstate banking, arguably served as something
of an oﬃcial recognition to the process of structural change that had been under way since the
deregulation of the early 1980s.16 The estimated break dates for the total series in 1966 is less
clear, as is the 1976 date for nonrevolving consumer credit. For the former, the 1966 break may be
capturing the beginning of the revolving series in 1968 (obviously contained within the total series),
15In particular, it did not take long for credit card markets to show the transforming eﬀects of the 1978 Supreme
Court Ruling that removed credit card interest rate ceilings (Evans and Schmalens (1998)).
16The Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 had two important provisions. The ﬁrst repealed the Douglass Amendment to the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, thereby allowing, beggining on September 29, 1995, full nationwide banking
regardless of state law. The second provision allowed for interstate branching, where a national bank, beginning on
June 1, 1997, can operate branches in more than one state without a seperate corporate structure for each state.
14while the 1976 date for nonrevolving credit may be indicative of the macroeconomic volatility of the
period, the rise of credit scoring, or perhaps other possible factors. However, the 1992 date for the
nonrevolving series, and even the 1995 date for the total series, are indicative of the consolidation
of commercial banking. As shown in Table 2.1, the number of commercial banks was relatively
stable up through the 1990s, but from 1992 to 2002 fell by almost half.
For consumption and its components a change in both the mean growth rate and the volatility
appears to have occurred over the course of the 1980s. The break dates in the early 1980s for
the mean growth rates of consumption and durables, and the dates found in the late 1980s for
the volatility of all three consumption series are consistent with a growing body of research that
has noted that something has changed in the macroeconomy since approximately the mid-1980s.
Though the emphasis is typically on the volatility of the macroeconomy (see McConnell and Perez-
Quiros (1999), Stock and Watson (2002), and Ahmed et al (2002)). Interestingly, a break date
is not found in the consumption series in the mid-1970s–an approximate date evocative of the
much-discussed productivity slowdown. Though for the sub-component, nondurables and services,
a break in the mean growth rate is found in1973.
The purpose of this section has been to investigate statistically whether structural breaks in
consumer credit and consumption have occurred. The results suggest that the processes underlying
the series–processes described with the mean growth rate and volatility of each series–are, in fact,
characterized by structural breaks. This appears to be particularly important for consumer credit.
Or, structural change appears to be ongoing (or is certainly more recent) in consumer credit. The
implications of these results are important. Simply put, any discussion of the relationship between
consumer credit–the use of credit cards, to be of a particular concern–and consumption behavior
must take note of these changes. Moreover, these breaks indicate one must take care in making
predictions or proclamations about consumer behavior. The next step, therefore, is to re-consider
consumption smoothing in light of this statistical evidence.
154 Structural Estimation of Consumption
In this section I estimate a structural equation in the spirit of Ludvigson (1999) and Bacchetta and
Gerlach (1997). I ask if the predictive power of consumer credit and income growth is diﬀerent
across periods in a structural equation for consumption. This approach is useful for at least a couple
of reasons. First, it provides an established method to test the permanent-income hypothesis
that allows for easy comparison with previous ﬁndings. That is, estimating with an “oﬀ the
shelf” consumption equation provides a ready comparison and contrast to the previous research on
consumption smoothing discussed in Section 2. Second, the equation emphasizes the importance of
consumer credit in explaining consumption behavior. Indeed, Ludvigson (1999) and Bacchetta and
Gerlach (1997) have found that consumer credit is a signiﬁcant predictor of consumption growth,
providing support not only for the failure of the hypotheses, but also suggesting that credit markets
are crucial in the story of that failure. This provides a useful vehicle for discerning the eﬀects of
structural and regulatory change in credit markets on the relationship between consumption growth
and consumer credit, in particular.
4.1 Single equation estimation
Again, to consider the time-varying relationship between consumer credit and consumption, I esti-
mate an “oﬀ the shelf” consumption equation. Speciﬁcally, Ludvigson (1999) estimates a structural
equation of the form,
∆ct =   + λEt−1∆yt + πEt−1rt + αEt−1∆dt + εt , (3)
where y is income, r is the real interest rate, d is credit growth, E is the expectations operator,
and εt is the error term orthogonal to the other regressors in period t − 1 and before. Where y
is real disposable income, c is real nondurable consumption expenditures plus real consumption
service expenditures, and the interest rate is the three month treasury bill rate less the inﬂation
16rate deﬁned by the consumer price index.17, 18 Using a sample of quarterly data over the years
1953 to 1993 for total consumer credit, and 1978 to 1993 for revolving consumer credit, Ludvigson
(1999) shows that both series are signiﬁcant predictors of consumption growth.
4.2 Samples
I estimate the structural equation using monthly data over a series of samples. First, I estimate
over the entire sample, January 1959 (1978 for revolving) to September 2005, and then compare
a split-sample–January 1959 to December 1983, and January 1984 to September 2005.19 This
sample split is motivated by research on the “Great Moderation” (see McConnell and Perez-Quiros
(1999), and others mentioned above).
Second, I estimate over sub-samples dictated by the break results from the previous section.
For revolving consumer credit, I compare the samples, January 1978 to December 1983; January
1984 to March 1998; and April 1998 to September 2005. For total consumer credit, I compare the
samples, January 1959 to January 1966; February 1966 to September 1995; and October 1995 to
September 2005. This allows me to consider how consumption behavior has changed over time
with statistical support to the sample divisions (as opposed to estimating over the split sample–
which simply provides a general picture of this potential change). Overall, these two steps provide
a picture of how consumption behavior may have evolved over time.
17Real disposable income (2000 dollars) is made availabe by the Department of commerce.
The real rate is calculated using the Fisher relationship, real = nominal - inﬂation rate.
18Consumer durables are ignored by Hall (1978) and the papers that followed (see references above). This is to
avoid computing the “use” value of consumption durables as opposed to the actual purchase. The “ﬁrst” generation of
tests of the permanent income hypothesis calculated consumption as the purchase of nondurables plus the depreciation
of the stock of durables (Mayer (1972)). Hall (1978) drops the durable component to “avoid the suspicion that the
ﬁndings are an artifact of the procedure for imputing a service ﬂow to the stock of durables”(p979). The literature
has followed this practice since.
19To replicate and compare with the previous research, an earlier version of this paper also estimated using quarterly
data (when possible given the sample lengths). However, the monthly estimation proved to be suﬃcient for
comparison, and served my particular need for sample length, so I report only the monthly results here.
174.3 Results
In practice equation (3) is estimated using two-stage least squares, with the period t − 2 lags
and beyond of the variables used as instruments. This strategy is followed for a number of
reasons. First, since consumption and the regressors are jointly determined, ordinary least squares
is inappropriate and instrumental variable estimation is necessary. Since the period t−1 expected
values of income growth and the other variables are not observable, it is necessary to ﬁnd variables
to use in their place. The period t variables are inappropriate instruments since under the null that
the permanent income hypothesis is true these variables are correlated with the error term. Second,
as is typical in previous research on estimation of consumption equations, due to serial correlation
associated with time averaged quarterly data, the actual t − 1 values of the regressors are also
inappropriate (this is obviously relevant when quarterly data is used; however, the instrument list
proved to be appropriate for the monthly data as well).20 Therefore, the instrument list includes
the t − 2 through t − 4 lags of consumption growth, income growth, credit growth credit, and the
interest rate.21 All variables are in expressed in logarithms except for the interest rate, which is
in percent.
Tables 4.1 through 4.4 display the results for equation (3). Each table reports the second stage
results showing the instrumental variable estimates for each regressor, as well as the ﬁrst stage F-
test and probability value for the regression of income and credit growth regressed on the instrument
set. In addition, I report the Sargan statistic for testing the overidentifying restrictions–i.e., that
20If the permanent income hypothesis is true, then measured consumption is the time average of a random walk.
However, Working (1960) showed that the time average of a continuous-time random walk is uncorrelated with all
variables lagged more than one period (Cambell and Mankiw (1989) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Marshall
(1991)).
21The t−2 value of an error correction term, the ratio of consumption to income, is also included as an instrument.
Note that the same instrument set was used for all sub-samples. This decision was made to make the comparison
across sub-samples as deviod of researcher interference as possible–that is, to avoid the temptation to data “mine”
or adjust the instrument set until the results “came out right.” Perhaps more detailed analysis is warranted on
the sub-periods analyzed here, e.g., ﬁnding if diﬀerent structural equations are necessary for diﬀerent periods–but
this level of detail I leave to extenstions of this paper. Here the purpose is to assume the received conclusions on
consumption estimation and then see how those conclusions may have changed over time. However, despite these
qualiﬁcations, in only one model out of the 23 reported here is the instrument set statistically questionable (based
on the Sargan Test).
18the instrument set is appropriate. Each table reports the results for three variants of (3). Model
1 contains only income growth as a regressor; model 2 adds the real interest rate; and model 3
adds credit growth. The latter version is run twice, once for total consumer credit and once for
revolving consumer credit.
4.3.1 Consumption and Total Consumer Credit
Table 4.1 displays the results for the consumption equation estimating with total consumer credit.
For the entire sample, expected income growth is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level in
the ﬁrst two models (columns 1 and 2) and comes close to statistical signiﬁcance at the ten percent
level in model 3 (column 3). In model 3, however, total consumer credit growth is a signiﬁcant
predictor of consumption growth at the ﬁve percent level. Overall, these results are consistent with
previous research on consumption behavior–that consumption growth is “excessively sensitive” to
income growth and consumer credit (the latter result found more recently by Ludvigson (1999) and
Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997)). That the real interest rate is typically not a statistically signiﬁcant
predictor is also consistent with the literature.
However, comparing the pre-“Great Moderation” era with period thereafter reveals a noticeable
diﬀerence the in consumption data. The early period, from 1962 up through 1983 conﬁrms the
conclusions of the full sample estimation, consumption is “excessively sensitive” to income growth
and consumer credit. Expected income growth and consumer credit growth are at least statistically
signiﬁcant at the ten percent level. However, the results from 1984 up through September of 2005
tell a diﬀerent story. The predictive power for consumption is not present in the second half of the
sample. In fact, none of the coeﬃcients across the three models are statistically signiﬁcant. This
split-sample comparison suggests that in the latter period the data is consistent with the permanent
income hypothesis–that is, consistent with consumption smoothing.
One limit on this split-sample comparison is the perhaps arbitrary split (supported by research
on the “Great Moderation” though it may be). Hence, drawing conclusions on consumption
smoothing based on this sample comparison may be premature. However, the statistical tests of
19section 3 provide some guidance on where structural change may have occurred, and hence, provide
a more statistically rigorous comparison across samples. Table 4.2 displays the results for samples
dictated by the statistical break tests above. For the two samples spanning 1959 through September
of 1995, the results are generally consistent with the full sample estimation. Income growth is a
signiﬁcant predictor of consumption at the ten percent level for the majority of the sample period.
However, consumer credit is not statistically signiﬁcant. Moreover, the late sample, 1995 through
2005, shows that the failure of the model to predict consumption behavior–particularly during
the years of the “Great Moderation”–appears to be concentrated in the years after the structural
break in total consumer credit found in late 1995.22
4.3.2 Consumption and Revolving Consumer Credit
In addition to testing the sensitivity of consumption to total consumer credit, I also test the
revolving component in the consumption equation.23 The results show that for most of the sample,
like total consumer credit, revolving credit does not predict consumption growth. Table 4.3 displays
the results in a similar manner as above, comparing the full sample to a split sample, and to
samples based on the structural break results from Section 3. Given the only regressor altered is
the consumer credit variable, Table 4.3 only displays the regression results for model 3.24
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.3 compare the full sample for revolving credit, 1978 to 2005, to
the “Great Moderation” sample, 1984 to 2005 (note that as in Section 3, estimation with revolving
consumer credit begins in 1978). Estimation over both samples reveals very little explanatory power
for both income growth and revolving consumer credit. Given the lack of explanatory power for
income growth shown in Table 4.1 for the “Great Moderation” sample, this is not surprising. In
22Additional estimation on samples split according to decade (not reported in this version of the paper) reveals
that total consumer credit is a signiﬁcant predictor of consumption in the 1980s, but fails to be so for the 1990s
sample.
23Ultimately, the information for the nonrevolving component proved to be redundant. For the sake of brevity, I
look at only the revolving component.
24The results for models 1 and 2 estimated over these diﬀerent sample periods did not change that much from
comparable samples displayed in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. For example, the results for model 2 estimated from 1995 to
2005 were not substantially diﬀerent than the results for 1998 to 2005, and hence it would have been redundant to
display the results.
20column 3 of Table 4.3, the coeﬃcient on revolving credit is not statistically signiﬁcant at the 10
percent level (though not far from it).
Only for the short sample, 1978 through 1983–which is dictated by the structural break results
above, but also serves, perhaps not coincidentally, as a brief pre-“Great Moderation” sample–
is revolving consumer credit a statistically signiﬁcant predictor of consumption growth. For the
remaining two sub-samples determined by the structural breaks found for revolving consumer credit,
1984 to April of 1998, and April 1998 through September 2005, the model proves inadequate for
predicting consumption growth (not only are the coeﬃcients not statistically signiﬁcant, but the
sign of the coeﬃcient on revolving credit runs counter to expectation).
4.4 Remarks
On balance, the results displayed in Tables 4.1 through 4.3 reveal that the predictability of con-
sumption growth is not apparent in the data over the period of time structural and regulatory
change evolved in credit markets. While estimation over earlier time periods–in particular, prior
to the mid-1980s–supports the much cited conclusion that consumption growth is “excessively
sensitive” to both income growth and consumer credit growth, this conclusion breaks down more
or less after the mid-1980s. Based on the split-sample estimation, split according to both research
consensus on the “Great Moderation,” and on the structural break search in Section 3, the data
suggests that consumption growth is no longer predicted by either income growth or consumer
credit growth. The are no longer statistical failures. Much of the statistical support for liquidity
constraints–or any other factor that might prevent consumption smoothing–deteriorates in the
era of deregulated credit markets.
5 Conclusion
On balance, the various statistical techniques in this paper reveal that the case for rejecting the
Life Cycle-Permanent Income hypotheses is weak once information on the structural and regula-
21tory change in credit markets is applied in testing the hypotheses. First, the statistical break
estimation in section 3 showed that structural change has occurred in the processes generating
both consumption growth, and in particular, consumer credit growth. These ﬁndings support the
notion discussed in Section 2 that regulatory and structural change in consumer credit markets has
made it easier for consumer to access credit, and are more likely to smooth consumption as a result.
Moreover, the estimation of a structural equation for consumption growth similarly supports that
hypothesis.
The motivation for this paper is the popular emphasis on liquidity constraints in helping explain
the empirical failure of the permanent income hypothesis. Considering so much attention has been
paid to constraints in credit markets, the structural and regulatory change in consumer credit
markets suggests important implications for consumer behavior. If structural change in consumer
credit markets has liberated the consumer, then statistical rejection of the permanent hypothesis
should be less likely as consumers become less liquidity constrained. The econometric experiments
in this paper support that proposition.
In other words, consumer behavior is able to come closer to the conception of the permanent
income hypothesis. As Hall (1978) argues, aggregate demand policy that only has an eﬀect on
transitory income will have little to no eﬀect on consumption when households are able to borrow in
anticipation of the change in income. The results here suggest consumers are able to do this more
in line with Hall’s expectation. Though Ludvigson (1999) and others have shown evidence that
the data once rejected the predictions of the permanent income hypothesis, in the era of liberalized
consumer credit markets, this appears to be no longer the case.
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29Table 2.1  Asset Characteristics of Commercial Banks  
Number of 
Banks





Fourth Quarter 2002 constant 2000 dollars (millions)
All Banks 7,887 6,765,941 858 88
95th percentile 395 5,722,674 14,488 2,532 0.85
Below 95th percentile 7,492 1,043,267 139 83 0.15
Fourth Quarter 1992 constant 2000 dollars (millions)
All Banks 11,462 4,027,554 351 61
95th percentile 574 3,016,403 5,255 1,749 0.75
Below 95th percentile 10,888 1,011,151 93 57 0.25
Fourth Quarter 1982 constant 2000 dollars (millions)
All Banks 14,406 3,425,680 238 47
95th percentile 721 2,511,164 3,483 904 0.73
Below 95th percentile 13,685 914,516 67 44 0.27
Fourth Quarter 1972 constant 2000 dollars (millions)
All Banks 13,728 2,629,548 192 38
95th percentile 687 1,875,072 2,729 818 0.71
Below 95th percentile 13,041 754,476 58 36 0.29
Notes: Numbers calculated for all FDIC-insured commercial banks. Data obtained from the FDIC. 
Dollar values are deflated using the GDP Deflator. Fraction of total assets calculated as ratio of total 
assets for each percentile group to total assets for all banks. 95th percentile  includes all banks at and 
above the 95th percentile in total assets.  Below 95th percentile  includes all banks below the 95th 
percentile in total assets.  Table 2.2  Loan Characteristics of Commercial Banks   
Number of 
Banks
Total Loans Mortgages C&I Consumer Credit Cards
Fourth Quarter 2002 constant 2000 dollars (millions)
All Banks 7,887 3,978,160 1,147,720 872,156 672,821 300,500
95th percentile 395 3,308,222 857,106 758,614 605,504 292,137
Below 95th percentile 7,492 669,938 290,614 113,542 67,318 8,363
Ratio
95th percentile 0.83 0.75 0.87 0.90 0.97
Below 95th percentile 0.17 0.25 0.13 0.10 0.03
Fourth Quarter 1992 constant 2000 dollars (millions)
All Banks 11,462 2,334,475 532,467 615,947 442,664 156,132
95th percentile 574 1,784,098 362,838 517,646 344,107 143,077
Below 95th percentile 10,888 550,377 169,629 98,301 98,557 13,055
Ratio
95th and above 0.76 0.68 0.84 0.78 0.92
Below 95th 0.24 0.32 0.16 0.22 0.08
Fourth Quarter 1982 constant 2000 dollars (millions)
All Banks 14,406 1,597,191 247,955 787,340 310,246 56,513
95th percentile 721 1,130,642 150,606 655,519 194,455 52,681
Below 95th percentile 13,685 466,549 97,349 131,821 115,791 3,832
Ratio
95th percentile 0.71 0.61 0.83 0.63 0.93
Below 95th percentile 0.29 0.39 0.17 0.37 0.07
Fourth Quarter 1972 constant 2000 dollars (millions)
All Banks 13,728 1,392,471 184,723 429,875 284,921 23,467
95th percentile 687 1,013,123 111,501 342,206 166,377 21,366
Below 95th percentile 13,041 379,348 73,222 87,669 118,543 2,101
Ratio
95th percentile 0.73 0.60 0.80 0.58 0.91
Below 95th percentile 0.27 0.40 0.20 0.42 0.09
Note: See comments for Table 2.1.  Ratio indicates the share of each loan category for each bank class. 
95th percentile includes all banks at and above the 95th percentile in total assets.  Below 95th percentile 








Estimated Break Dates for 
model with m=2
1 20.48 11.47 23.61 11.47 February 1966
2 21.95 9.75 7.67 12.95 September 1995
3 16.84 8.36 4.7 14.03 -
4 13.71 7.19 -
5 11.39 5.85 -








Estimated Break Dates for 
model with m=2
1 44.73 10.98 13.67 10.98 December 1983
2 29.66 8.98 3.77 12.55 April 1998
3 21.096 7.13 - - -








Estimated Break Dates for 
model with m=3
1 21.27 11.47 41.62 11.47 October 1961
2 25.60 9.75 41.62 12.95 August 1976
3 31.03 8.36 8.36 14.03 October 1992
4 26.22 7.19 - - -
5 19.02 5.85 - - -
Table 3.1  Structural Break Tests on the Mean Growth Rate of Consumer Credit 
Notes: SupF statistics estimated using Bai and Perron (1998) methods, with Gauss code made available by Bai 
and Perron. Critical values from Table 1, Bai and Perron (1998).  The estimated break dates are for m are 
chosen for the value that maximizes the SupF statistics.  The dates are chosen by global optimization (see Bai 
and Perron (1998)).  
C. NonRevolving Consumer Credit: January 1959 to September 2005
B. Revolving Consumer Credit: January 1978 to September 2005
A. Total Consumer Credit: January 1959 to September 2005Regime Coefficients Standard Errors
1959:3 - 1966:01 α 0.508 0.086
ρ 0.270 0.105
1966:02 - 1995:08 α 0.085 0.024
ρ 0.705 0.037
1995:09 - 2005:09 α 0.292 0.051
ρ 0.232 0.090
1978:1 - 1983:11 α 0.158 0.092
ρ 0.694 0.092
1984:1 - 1998:4 α 0.594 0.0817
ρ 0.339 0.073
1998:5 - 2005:9 α 0.209 0.058
ρ 0.045 0.088
1959:3 - 1961:10 α 0.508 0.086
ρ 0.270 0.105
1961:10 - 1976:7 α 0.093 0.074
ρ 0.120 0.086
1976:8 - 1992:10 α 0.020 0.033
ρ 0.734 0.050
1993:11 - 2005:9 α 0.361 0.051
ρ 0.185 0.080
C. NonRevolving Consumer Credit January 1959 to September 2005
Notes: Table shows coefficients of AR(1) model across sub-samples 
chosen by Bai and Perron's (1998) sequential method.
B. Revolving Consumer Credit January 1978 to September 2005
Table 3.2  Estimation of model selected by Bai and 
Peron (1998) Sequential Method
A. Total Consumer Credit January 1959 to September 2005Series Dates F-Test
Probability 
Value
     Total Consumer Credit February 1966 9.86 0.000
September 1995 8.52 0.000
     Revolving Consumer Credit December 1983 3.54 0.029
April 1998 12.33 0.000
     Nonrevolving Consumer Credit October 1961 1.31 0.272
August 1976 5.02 0.006
October 1992 4.32 0.013
     Consumption  January 1984 7.54 0.000
     Durables April 1982 12.59 0.000
     Nondurables and Services  December 1973 6.14 0.002
Notes: The Chow test is for each series modeled as an AR(1).  The dates chosen 
correspond to the structural break estimates in Tables 3.1 and 3.4.








Estimated Break Dates for 
model with m=1
1 16.81 11.47 4.77 11.47 January 1984
2 10.97 9.75 5.39 12.95
3 8.07 8.36 6.84 14.03
4 7.89 7.19 0.75 14.85
5 6.54 5.85 - -








Estimated Break Dates for 
model with m=1
1 25.67 11.47 6.52 11.47 April 1982
2 15.98 9.75 3.001 12.95
3 10.89 8.36 1.39 14.03
4 8.002 7.19 1.31 14.85
5 6.801 5.85 - -








Estimated Break Dates for 
model with m=1
1 14.28 11.47 4.9 11.47 December 1973
2 8.98 9.75 8.59 12.95
3 8.98 8.36 5.43 14.03
4 8.05 7.19 0.26 14.85
5 6.45 5.85 - -
A. Consumption: March 1959 to September 2005
B. Durables: March 1959 to September 2005
Table 3.4  Structural Break Tests on the Mean Growth Rate of Consumption
Notes: See comments to Table 3.1.  
C. Nondurables and Services: March 1959 to September 2005Regime Coefficients Standard Errors
1959:03 - 1983:12 α 0.320 0.038
ρ -0.053 0.058
1984:01 - 2005:09 α 0.380 0.035
ρ -0.380 0.058
1959:03 - 1982:04 α 0.330 0.173
ρ 0.078 0.062
1982:05 - 2005:09 α 0.706 0.17
ρ -0.330 0.054
1959:03 - 1973:12 α 0.430 0.035
ρ -0.240 0.067
1974:01 - 2005:09 α 0.310 0.021
ρ -0.260 0.051
Notes: See notes to Table 3.2.
C. Nondurables and Services: March 1959 to September 2005
Table 3.5  Estimation of model selected by Bai and 
Peron (1998) Sequential Method
A. Consumption Expenditures: March 1959 to September 2005








Estimated Break Dates for 
model with m=1
1 13.9 11.47 12.09 11.47 January 1966
2 12.98 9.75 11.83 9.75 -
3 12.57 8.36 3.9 8.36 -
4 17.7 7.19 - - -
5 13.81 5.85 - - -








Estimated Break Dates for 
model with m=1
1 49.8 10.98 9.64 10.98 April 1998
2 29.2 8.98 4.87 12.55
3 17.85 7.13 - - -








Estimated Break Dates for 
model with m=3
1 9.47 11.47 6.59 11.47 -
2 5.52 9.75 14.49 12.95 -
3 8.41 8.36 5.91 14.03 -
4 7.34 7.19 - - -
5 8.76 5.85 - - -
Notes: SupF statistics estimated using Bai and Perron (1998) methods, with Gauss code made available by Bai 
and Perron. Critical values from Table 1, Bai and Perron (1998).  The volatility is captured by the absolute value  
of the growth rate of each series. 
Table 3.6  Structural Break Tests on the Volatility of Consumer Credit 
B. Revolving Consumer Credit January 1978 to September 2005
C. NonRevolving Consumer Credit January 1959 to September 2005
A. Total Consumer Credit January 1959 to September 2005Regime Coefficients Standard Errors
1959:3 - 1965:12 α 0.562 0.086
ρ 0.232 0.106
1966:01 - 2005:09 α 0.282 0.025
ρ 0.432 0.041
1978:1 - 1998:4 α 0.519 0.065
ρ 0.431 0.060
1998:5 - 2005:9 α 0.380 0.049
ρ 0.100 0.076
Table 3.7  Estimation of model selected by Bai and 
Peron (1998) Sequential Method: Volatility
A. Total Consumer Credit January 1959 to September 2005
Notes: Table shows coefficients of AR(1) model across sub-samples 
chosen by Bai and Perron's (1998) sequential method.  The volatility is 
captured by the absolute value  of the growth rate of each series.  No 
breaks in the volatility of nonrevolving consumer credit were found.  
B. Revolving Consumer Credit January 1978 to September 2005Series Dates F-Test
Probability 
Value
     Total Consumer Credit January 1966 6.06 0.002
     Revolving Consumer Credit April 1998 10.5 0.000
     Nonrevolving Consumer Credit -- -- --
     Consumption  Februrary 1987 10.09 0.000
     Durables December 1984 7.31 0.000
     Nondurables and Services  October 1988 13.50 0.000
Table 3.8  Chow Stability Tests: Volatility
Notes: The Chow test is for each series modeled as an AR(1).  The dates chosen 








Estimated Break Dates for 
model with m=1
1 28.0483 11.47 8.16 11.47 Februrary 1987
2 17.9739 9.75 7.86 12.95
3 13.7876 8.36 7.86 14.03
4 13.3064 7.19 - -
5 10.6066 5.85 - -








Estimated Break Dates for 
model with m=1
1 15.7357 11.47 4.99 11.47 December 1984
2 9.0046 9.75 4.65 12.95
3 7.8939 8.36 4.36 14.03
4 7.0506 7.19 - -
5 9.8198 5.85 - -








Estimated Break Dates for 
model with m=1
1 32.876 11.47 4.5099 11.47 October 1988
2 17.614 9.75 4.5099 12.95
3 16.875 8.36 4.1804 14.03
4 11.8163 7.19 1.381 14.85
5 9.6829 5.85 - -
Notes: See comments to Table 3.1.  The volatility is captured by the absolute value  of the growth rate of each 
series. 
Table 3.9  Structural Break Tests on the Volatility of Consumption
A. Consumption: March 1959 to September 2005
B. Durables: March 1959 to September 2005
C. Nondurables and Services: March 1959 to September 2005Regime Coefficients Standard Errors
1959:03 - 1987:02 α 0.561 0.035
ρ 0.116 0.049
1987:03 - 2005:09 α 0.390 0.041
ρ 0.009 0.080
1959:03 - 1984:12 α 1.871 0.170
ρ 0.130 0.061
1985:01 - 2005:09 α 1.262 0.167
ρ 0.445 0.052
1959:03 - 1988:10 α 0.465 0.024
ρ -0.013 0.048
1988:11 - 2005:09 α 0.327 0.031
ρ -0.091 0.086
Notes: See notes to Table 3.7.
C. Nondurables and Services: March 1959 to September 2005
Table 3.10  Estimation of model selected by Bai and 
Peron (1998) Sequential Method: Volatility
A. Consumption Expenditures: March 1959 to September 2005
B. Durables Expenditures: March 1959 to September 2005Income growth 0.21 0.19 0.12 0.322 0.318 0.261 0.075 0.092 0.078
(2.33)* (2.25)* (1.62) (2.55)* (2.43)* (1.84)** (0.75) (1.02) (0.94)
Interest Rate - -0.003 -0.006 - 0.001 -0.0005 - 0.0002 -0.0019
(-0.43) (-0.86) (0.07) (-0.04) - (0.02) (-0.17)
Credit Growth - - 0.064 - - 0.08 - - 0.02
- - (1.99)* - - (1.89)** - - (0.45)
First Stage Results
F-test (Income) 3.19 2.31 1.96 3.19 2.29 1.85 2.15 1.86 1.61
p-value 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.08
F-test (Credit) - - 37.49 - - 22.02 - - 15.54
p-value - - 0.00 - - 0.00 - - 0.00
Test of Restrictions 11.27 12.76 20.54 8.26 10.65 16.81 8.54 9.36 9.69
The instrument set includes lags two through four of each regressor (when appropriate for each specification), lags two through four of 
consumption growth, and an error correction term, the lag two log difference of consumption and income. All variables expect for the 
interest rate are expressed in seasonally adjusted 2000 dollars, and transformed into logarithms. The first stage results report the F-
statistic and associated probability value of a regression of income growth and credit growth regressed on the instruments, respectively. 
The last row reports the Sargan statistic for testing overidentifying restrictions (distributed as chi-square in the number of restrictions). 
The italics in this row indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent level.  This is only the case for column three; in all 
other cases the test fails to reject the hull hypothesis.  
Total Consumer Credit 
1959.02 to 2005.09 (n=556)
Table 4.1  Instrumental Variables Estimation of Monthly Consumption Growth: Before and During the 
"Great Moderation"
Notes: Results displayed for instrumental variables estimation of consumption growth on the regressors income growth, the interest 
rate and credit growth. T-statistics are in parentheses, calculated with standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation.  The *indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level and **indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level.  
1984.01 to 2005:09 (n=261) 1962.04 to 1983:12 (n=261)       Income growth 0.331 0.232 0.620 0.247 0.205 0.192 -0.015 -0.044 -0.045
(1.12) (0.57) (1.88)** (2.09)* (1.91)** (1.77)** (-0.12) (-0.35) (-0.36)
Interest Rate - 0.03 -0.05 - -0.01 -0.01 - 0.002 0.02
(0.29) (-0.55) (-0.61) (-0.76) - (0.18) (0.89)
Credit Growth - - 0.15 - - 0.05 - - -0.19
- - (0.742) - - (1.40) - - (-0.98)
First Stage Results
F-test (Income) 0.38 0.43 0.43 2.27 1.71 1.43 0.92 0.97 0.95
p-value 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.49 0.47 0.50
F-test (Credit) - - 3.51 - - 28.68 - - 1.96
p-value - - 0.00 - - 0.00 - - 0.03
Test of Restrictions 4.19 4.39 11.08 10.73 13.54 16.45 1.09 1.62 2.41
Notes: See comments to Table 4.1.
Table 4.2  Instrumental Variables Estimation of Monthly Consumption Growth: Sub-Samples across 1959 
to 2005 
Total Consumer Credit 
1959.01 to 1966.01 (n=80)         1966.02 to 1995:09 (n=355)        1995.10 to 2005:09 (n=121)Income growth 0.094 0.071 0.032
(0.94) (0.78) (0.34)
Interest Rate - -0.006 -0.015
- (-0.62) (-1.59)
Credit Growth - - 0.085
- - (1.61)
First Stage Results
F-test (Income) 1.91 1.71 1.52
p-value 0.07 0.08 0.11
F-test (Credit) - - 8.67
p-value - - 0.00
Test of Restrictions 11.27 12.83 11.57
Table 4.3  Instrumental Variables Estimation of Monthly Consumption Growth from 
1978 to 2005:  Before and During the "Great Moderation"
Revolving Consumer Credit 
1978.01 to 2005.09 (Full Sample)
1984.01 to 2005:09  
(n=261)
1978.01 to 1983.11   






















Table 4.4  Instrumental Variables Estimation of Monthly Consumption 
Growth: Sub-Samples across 1978 to 2005 
B. Revolving Consumer Credit 
1978.01 to 1983.11 
(n=71)        
1983.12 to 1998:03 
(n=172)             













Notes: See comments to Table 4.1.